We consider broadcast apphcations where the transmissions need to be encrypted, such as direct broadc-t digitd TV networks or Internet mtdticasts. In these apphcations the number of encrypted TV programs may be very large, but the secure memory capacity at the set-top termin~(S~) is severely Lmited due to the need to withstand pirate attacks and hardware tampering. Despite this, we wotid fike to dow the vendor to offer different pa~ges of programs to the users. A user who buys a package shotid be able to view every program belonging to that package, but nothing eke. A flexible scheme shodd flow for packages of various sizes to be offered, from a single program up to M the programs.
Introduction

The Problem
The domain we consider in this paper is that of broadc~t apphcations where the transmissions need to be encrypted. As a primary example we consider a direct broadcast digitd TV network, broadcasting either via sate~te or via cable, but other apphcations such as Internet mtiticasts are similar. The reason encryption is needed is to ensure that ody paying customem, who have the required keys, wti be able to view the programs~fQ95].
In this context, the head-end broadcasts the encrypted TV programs to a large poptdation of users. Each network user h= a set-top terminal (STT) which receives the encrypted broadcast and decrypts the programs that the user is entitled to. The secret information which is stored inside a user's set-top terrnind (keys and access control data) is co~ectively c~ed an entitlement.
Becawse of extensive piracy, these STTS need to contain a secure chip, either directly or on a smart-card, which inPermission to make digital or hard copies of all or part o~this work for personal or classroom use is granted \\+thoutfee provided that copies arc not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otheni,ise, to republish, to post on sen'ers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission andlor a fee. 5th Conference on Computer& Communications Security San Francisco CA USA Copyright ACM 19981-581 134074/98/1 1...$5.00 eludes secure memory for the entitlements. This memory shotdd be non-volatile, writ able (since keys are changed every biMng period), and tamper-resistant (so the pirates wif id it diffitit to read its contents). As a restdt of these requirements, S~s have severely hmit ed secure memory, typicfly in the range of a few KB1 [Gem9S] . On the other hand, the number of programs that may be broadcast during a bi~ng period can be large, say 200,000 or more. The problem we are faced with is how to manage the keys for such an application. We are trying to achieve the fo~owing two gods 1. Flexibility:
We wodd Eke to dow the TV network to offer many different packages of programs to the users. A user who buys a pahge shodd be able to view every program belonging to that package, but nothing eke. A flexible scheme shotid Wow for packages of various sizes, from a single program up to * the programs. This flexibihty shotid be obtained under the constraint that the STTS can ordy store very few keys.
2. Security: Piracy is a major concern, so fl the components of the scheme must be made secure. We must certaifly ensure that it is infeasible to attack the encryption dgonthms directly. In addition, we shotid not completely trust the "tamper-resistance" the STTS. This is since pirates have been notoriously successti in tampering with these devices. A good scheme is one where if the pirates break into an STT they wodd not be able to decrypt more than what that STT'S owner was entitled to.
Contributions
In this paper we describe key management schemes which achieve the flexiblhty and security go~we set for ourselves, and which use very fittle secure memory in the S~s. The computational power required of the STTS by the schemes is very low. The security of these schemes is as good or better than that offered by current technology. Thus they offer practical and apphcable solutions.
We start by describing a simple scheme cded ExtHeader, which is a variant of the we~known "encrypt the session key with the user key" technique. The scheme works by adding header information to each broadc~t program. Using it, any predefied set of programs can be a package. Thus the scheme has fd flexibtity-dthough the length of the header information grows with the number of pa~ges.
If the number of predefied packages is not too large then ExtHeader may be a reasonable choice.
1Kilobyte.
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-. , -. --Our main contribution is the Vspace scheme. By using it we can provide a high degree of flexibihty in the creation of program packages, essentidy without adding any overhead to the transmission. Moreover, the pa~ges need not be prd efined completely, and to some extent may be customized to fit a user's individud taste. The price we pay for this freedom is that not every arbitrary set of programs maybe a pa~ge (e.g., packages can ody be of 1,3,7,15,..., 2" -1 programs).
Note that if a pirate is able to pry open an STT which is entitled to d the programs and to extract the secret information from it, then our schemes offer the same level of se curity offered by existing schemes. However our schemes are stronger in that they do not dow the pirate to 'tipgrade" an STT from a cheap package to an expensive one by low cost chip rewriting attacks (cf. [AK97]). In our schemes, if an STT is not entitled to decode a certain program, then the decryption key does not exist in the S~-it is not merely 'masked off n, as is the case in existing schemes. In other words, we prevent the type of tampering recently publicized in the Internet browser arena, in which a few bits in the exe cutable fles of brows em with 'titernationd-grade" security were pat ched to activate dormant "US-grade" security codẽ or98], thus bypassing US export restrictions. Moreover, urdike current schemes, breaking into an STT that is not f~y entitled does not compromise our scheme completely.
The rest of this paper is structured as fo~ows. We review some related work in Section 2. In Section 3 we describe the ExtHeader scheme. The Vspace scheme is presented in Sections 4 and 5. The security of both schemes is discussed in Section 6. In Section 7 we analyze the addressing power of the Vspace scheme, and we conclude with some directions for future work in Section 8.
Related Work
The bit-vector scheme. This is the most poptiar access control scheme in current use. It is used by most of the analog European sate~te TV systems such as the Sky VideoCrypt systems~cC96, p. 410], and *O by the US digitd DirectTV system~ir98]~cC96, p. %56].
In this scheme,~the programs are encrypted with the same key, which is stored in every Sm. To control the user's access to the programs, the STT *O stores additiond data, which we can abstractly view as a bit-vector b which has an entry for each program. The STT decrypts a program p ody if b~] = 1. Thus the scheme ha f~flexibihty, since the user can buy any set of programs as a package.
However it has two major disadvantages. First, the access control is non-cryptographic. Therefore if the pirates can overwrite the bit-vector with an fl-1 vector, the STT wi~decrypt every program and bypass the access control entirely. Pirates have reportedy taken advantage of this weakness in etisting systems~IcC96]. Secondy, the scheme needs to store the bit-vector in secure memory. Therefore the size of the bit-vector may become prohibitive when the number of programs is large.
The block-by-block scheme. In this scheme, the prg rams are sptit into n disjoint blocks. M the programs be longing to a block are encrypted using the same key. The STT stores the keys for each block that the user buys. According to the pirates' reports, such a system has been used in the D2-MAC EuroCrypt system~IcC96, p. 411].
The block-by-block scheme is more secure than the bitvector scheme since the access control is cryptographic. In addition the secure memory requirements are smd; at most n keys need to be stored. The main drawback of this scheme is its poor fiezibilitysince a user cannot buy less than a large block of programs. Moreover, a program which is required to belong to several blocks incurs a high overhead. Such a program needs to be r~encrypted with mdtiple block keys, and r~transmitted separately for each block.
A possible remedy is to spht the programs into many blocks which contain ody a few programs each, or even to have a single program per block. But then the amount of secure memory in the S~Emits the maximal number of block keys that a user may buy, and in partitiar a user may be unable to buy the set of~programs as a pa~ge. So the remedy may be worse than the original problem. How to transfer keys to the STTS?
A related quet ion is how to transfer the key information to the set-top termin~at the beginning of each b~ng period in a secure and efficient way. Two types of solutions can be found in the literature, which Wer in the communication model they assume.
In the first model, the ody type of communication between the head-end and S~s is the uni-directiond broadcast. Under this model, Fiat and Naor~N94] suggested methods of securely broadcasting key information such that ody a selected set of users can decrypt this information while co~tions of up to k other users can learn nothing. Extensions to this basic work can be found in @C94, BFS96, LS98].
In the second model, the STTS *O have an uphnk capabfity (e.g., via a phone fine or cabl~modem). This is more re~stic since most current systems have such a "cWback" feature. In the design described in [CEFH95] the head-end runs a secure and authenticated protocol with every Sẽ ach bi~ng period. During this protocol key information is dotioaded to the STT, and pay-per-view data is uploaded. This architecture offers better security than the one based on uni-directiond communication in that it Kmits a pirate's abtity to obtain secret keys-they are never broadcasted. Alternative approaches. Key management schemes which have f~flexibfity (i.e.,~ow users to access any set of programs they wish) can be found in [CT90, HP95] . However their techniques rely on WA pubtic-key cryptographỹ A7s] and therefore are not considered to be appbcable in our scenario. This is mostly since the recommended key lengths of pubhc keys, say 1024 bits (cf. [Sch96]), wotid severely tax the hmited secure memory of the STT (typ ic~y 2-sKB for commerci~y available smart-card based boxes [Gem9S]), and since MA computations are typicfly not fast enough to control the video access on slow smartcard CPUS.
Protocok for conference key distribution [CCS9, Ber91, Gon94] have more stringent security requirements than we do here, such as verifying the key's authenticity and repeting replay attacks. Moreover they do not address our main constraint, which is the hmited secure storage of the STTS.
3 The Extended-Header Scheme
The Scheme
We star~by describing a simple scheme which we denote by ExtHeader. The main idea in this scheme is that we attach cryptographic header information to each program. By transmitting more data we can overcome the hmited secure storage at the S~s. The scheme is a variation of the we~known "encrypt the session key using a user key" technique. However instead of having a separate key for each user, we arrange the programs into predefied packages, and each pabge has a key. Each program may belong to many pakges, and each user may have the keys to mdtiple packages.
Suppose that a program p belongs to t pacbges. Then the transmission of p consists of the encrypted program itse~, and a fist. of t header blocks. Each header block H contains two fields: the package identifier field H.ID and the key field H. I{ey. When the ID field contains the package identifier j, then the Key field contains E,j (I{p), which is the program key I{P encrypted using the package key s,. We say that the program key l{P is coweredusing the package key SJ.
Not e that the encryption used for the programs may be different from the encryption used to cover the keys. The former needs to dow red-time decryption of a video stream, while the latter ody encrypts short but potentifly more sensitive keys.
The ExtHeader scheme is aheady a big improvement over the block-by-block scheme in terms of flexibility, since any set of programs may constitute a package. Its simplicity is another attractive feature.
3.2
Decreasing the Header Bandwidth A few extra KB of headers may seem neghgible in comparison to the size of a typical video chp. However note that this header information shodd be transmitted fairly frequently. This is due to the fact that when Mce switches to view program p the S~needs to wait until p's next header is received before it can start decrypting. Infrequent header transmission wotid cause Uce to notice delay when she switches channek. Therefore the scheme h= a design tradeoff between the bandwidth docated to header trm ission, and the delay a user wodd incur when switching channels. Since tolerable delays are measured in fractions of a second, the bandwidth overhead may be si@cant.
Moreover, bandwidth docated to cryptographic headers shodd not be compared to the bandwidth docated to prg rams but rather to that~ocated to other types of control information. Direct broadcasting operators are usu~y rl uctant to add more overhead badwidth since it cannot be bNed for, and may potentidy decrease the number of TV channeb that can be packed into a single sate~te transponder [Sha98]. Thus commercial considerations may make this scheme unattractive in its basic form.
To overcome this problem, we suggest the fo~owing mechanism. Assume that the STT is powered up and receiving the broadcast transmission continuously (even when the TV is turned off). Assume further that in addition to its smd secure memory, the STT has access to a large insecure memory, e.g., banks of low-cost RAM. Then the STT can use this RAM as a key cache and thereby reduce the frequency of header transmission.
The STT needs to receive the broadcast continuously and scan W the channek for header blocks. For every transmitted program p, if one of its header blocks belongs to a package that the user is entitled to, the STT copies the block into the cache. We then say that the header block was captured by the STT. When Mce switches to program p the required header block win Weady be in the cache, provided that the STT was operational long enough to capture it. Therefore a noticeable delay wi~ordy occur when the S~is powered up for the first time, or when Afice attempts to switch to a program she is not entitled to. Using this capturing mechatism, we can choose the frequency of header transmissions based on the tolerable power-up delay, which maybe on the order of seconds or even minutes.
Note that the headers are copied to the cache without decrypting their Key field. The program keys are uncovered inside the secure chip ordy when tice switches to a specific program. Thus the ody information a pirate can obtain by reading the~nsecue) cache is the fist of programs that Wce is entitled to. The actual data placed in the cache can just as easily be extracted from the broadcast transmission itse~.
An alternative mechanism wotid be to designate a fixed channel which wotid repeatedy broadcast the header information of fl the programs for the next hour (say). Such a fixed channel, cded a Barker channel, may &eady exist in the system (e.g., serving as a directory Esting). If such is the case then the extra header bandwidth may be 'for free" in some sense since the Barker channel is not used to broadcast program contents.
4 The Vspace Scheme
Overview
In the ExtHeader scheme we needed to attach large headem to each program in order to achieve flexibfity in packaging the programs. In the Vspace scheme we achieve comparable flexibihty essenti~y without attaching any extra headers.
The ody piece of information we attach to a program's transmission is a single n-bit cryptographic identifier, or CID. However this CID is not chosen arbitrarily. We shs ee that imposing a spedc structme on these identifiers is cruci~to the scheme's useftiess.
The program encryption keys cannot be chosen arbitrarily either. The encryption key of a program p is a function of its CID and of secret data stored at the head-end. The S~recomputes the key using the transmitted CID and its own secret data. However the secret data stored in the STT ody dews the decryption of programs with certain CIDS, namely those which belong to the package the user buys.
Findy, the Vspace scheme does not Wow every arbitrary co~ection of programs to be a package. One simple restriction is that ody couections of 1,3,7,..., 2n -1 prg rams may constitute a package.2 However we argue that the large variability in package size, from a single program package up to~the programs, gives sufficient flexibi~ty.
In the rest of this paper we identify a program with its CID, and refer interchangeably to either a '>rogram p" or a '>rogram with CID p".
The Vspace scheme is parametrized by two numbers. The length (in bits) of a CID is denoted by n, and the length of an encryption key is denoted by k. We require that k > n for the scheme to work. A convenient value for n is n = 32, as this size dews a program's CID to be placed in the ECM3 field defined in the MPEG-2 standard~PE94]. For sake of concreteness we can think of using encryption keys of length k =64 or k = 128 tits.
*~lore~reci~elY, a pachge consistsof programslvithZ" -1 CIDS; note that it is possibleto assignthe sameGID to multipleprograms.
3EntitlementControl Message.
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The Vspace scheme rehes on basic resdts of bear algebra. A good reference book for the required mathematical background is~M77].
We use boldface letters to denote program CIDS, which we view as n-bit vectors over GF(2). We use capital letters to denote matrices over GF(2).
Generating the Encryption Keys
At the beginning of every bibg period, the head-end chooses a random Emary k x n matrix M cded the master matrix. The k-bit columns of the matrix M, denoted by ml,..., m., are ctied the master keys of the scheme. We require the master keys to be linearly independent k-dimensiond vectors over GF(2). Therefore the matrix M is n-dimensiond.
The keys for encrypting the programs are generated from the master keys as fo~ows. A program whose CID is p is encrypted using the key I Key(p)= Mp.
(1)
This method of generating keys as hear combinations of the master keys is simflar to the techniques used in [IN89, ARV95, FS96] to construct provably secure pseud~random generators. However a pseud~random generator in itseĩ s not stiaent for our purposes; in the next section we show how we capit~ze on the finearity of the scheme in the definitions of the possible packages. Remarks:
q A program which has CID p = O wotid get Key(p) = O for any master matrix M. An fl-zero key is considered a weak key in some encryption algorithms (e.g., DES~ES77]), and some encryption dgonthms (nt ably shift-register based ones) actufly produce a ciphertext which is identicd to the pbtext when the key is d zeros. Therefore we may as we~=ign the CID p = O to any program that needs to be broadcast in the clear, such as directory tistings or the major TV network' broadcasts. We can then use the value Key(p) = O as a flag to bypass the encryption (or decryption) dgonthm altogether.
q Since we require the master keys to be kearly indp endent, it is impossible that a program p # O wodd accidentfly get a zero key, and thus be broadcast in the clear.
q Since k > n itis always possible to pick n hnearly tidependent k-bit mmter keys. Indeed if we pick n keys unifo~y at random then the probabtity of their being Knearly independent is P(master keys are Knearly independent) = n-l
U(
1-L )
> e-1.3S6J2k-"
2k-t -i=o
For n =32 and k = 64 t~s v~ue is~1 _ lo-lo.
The Unear Subspace Paradigm
At fit sight, the key generation scheme proposed in the previous section seems to "leak information". If Ahce knows the keys Key(pl ), Key(p2) of programs pl and p2, then she can compute Key(pl ) @ Key(p2), which is precisely the key to the program pl @ p2 by the hnearity of the scheme.
However this "deficiency" turns out to be the source of the scheme's flexibl~ty. To see this, we introduce the central paradigm of the Vspace scheme (and the reason for its name), which is A user is ody Wowed to buy an entitlement for a linear subspace of pro~arn CIDs.
So in fact the user Mce does not gain any information she is not entitled to. Since she is entitled to decrypt both P1 ad P2, she mmt have bought (and paid for) a hear subspace U of CIDS which contains both pl and p2. But U must *O contain pl @ p2 by the definition of a bear subspace. Therefore if Mce can decrypt both pl and P2, then the price she paid for the entitlement &eady reflects her abfity to decrypt pl @ p2.
An r-dimensiond hnear subspace over GF(2) contains 2' vectors (CIDS), one of which is O (marking plaintext prg rams). This is the reason why packages can ody contain 1,3,7,15 . . . . 2" -1 programs.
4.4
Creating the Entitlements and Decryption
Assume that Mce has decided to buy a package of programs which is characterized by an r-dimensiond kear subspace U of CIDS. Then the head-end needs to generate an entitle ment which W dow Mce to decrypt any program p E U but nothing &e. In Section 4.4.1 we describe what such an entitlement consists of, and how the head-end can generate it. An optional part of the entitlement is the check matrix. If the STT has the check matrix it can determine whether a program p is in the decrypt-able space U without going through the whole decryption procedure. The check matrix is described in Section 4.4.2.
4.4.1
The Decryption Procedure I
The inputs for the head-end procedure that generates the de , cryption data are the mater matrix M, and the r-dimension~1 subspace U. We assume that U is represented by a basis, i.e., an n x r matrix B.
Consider some program p c U. Since B is a basis for U we can write p as a kear combination of the basis vectors, i.e., there exists an r-dimension~vector x such that
Given B and p, we need to solve (2) for x. Note that if r < n~.e., U is not the space of d programs) then the equation system (2) is over-defie~it has n equations and r variables. Nevertheless, if p G U we know a solution exists. In the next defition we identify the data needed to solve (2) (see Figure 1) . Proofi Clearly x is the unique solution to the system of equations B'x = p' since B' is re@ar. Thus x solves the r equations of (2) corresponding to the active indices. However any solution to the whole system (2) must solve these r equations in particdar. Therefore if (2) has a solution at d it can ordy be x. But (2) has a solution since p E U and B is a basis for U, so x is the required solution.T he matrix (B')-l and the active indices il, ..., ir form one par~of the entitlement. Another part, which actu~y contains the secret key data, is the foHowing matrix 1{. 
Procedure De~t-V decrypts a program p correctly if and only if p c U.
Proof: Assume that p c U. Then using Definition 4.3 and Proposition 4.2, and plugging (2) and (1) we have that Dec = l{x = MBx = Mp = Key(p), thus the decryption key is correct.
For the other direction, assume that p @ U. Then no solution exists for the kear equation system (2), and in partidar the x computed by Decrypt-V is not a solution, i.e., Bx = z # p for this x. Thus Decryp& V wotid generate the key Dec = Key(z) which is incorrect for program p.R emarks:If p @ U then procedure Decrypt-V generates a valid key Key(z) to some program z which is different from p. However z E U is a tinear combination of basis vectors (whereas p is not) so the procedure does not generate keys that the user is not entitled to.
In order to make the decrmtion more efficient. it is possible merge the secret~o'mponents 1{, (B')-i and il ..., i~into a single k x n matrix D. In this reprs entation procedure Decrypt-V computes the key by a single matrix mtitipbcation Dec + Dp.
The Check Matrix
For any program p the Decrypt-V procedure of the previous section generates a key and attempts to decrypt the prg ram. However if p is outside the entitled subspace U then the key is incorrect and the program win not be decrypted. Thus the STT cannot distin@sh between programs that fd to be decrypted due to transmission errors and those that fail because they are outside the subspace U. This may be undesirable since the STT cannot give the user any meaningfd feedback regarding the cause of the problem.
To amend this situation, the check matrix can be added to the entitlement. With this extra information the STT can easily check if the selected program p is in the entitled subspace U or not, without attempting to decrypt it. In the field of error correcting codes~S77] such a matrix is known as a parity check matrix.
Definition
Let B be a basis matrix for a subspace U. Let B1l bean rxn matrix whose active index columns il . . . . i, contain the columns of (B')-l, and is o everywhere else. Let I be the n-dimensional unit matrix. Then the n x n check matrix C is IC=BB''-I. I
The test for the decrypt-abifity of a program with a CID p is based on the fo~owing proposition.
Proposition
Cp = O if and only if p c U.
Proofi If p c U then it is easy to see that x = B"p is the solution to the hnear system of equations (2). Therefore by tinearity we have that
Conversely, if p~U then Bx p for* x, and in partitiar Bx-p#Oforx=B"p.
Remark
If the entitled subspace U is the space of all CIDS, then any basis matrix B is an n-dimensiond re@ar matrix in itseE, and thus B" = B-l and BB" = I. So the check matrix C becomes fl zero and the test of Proposition 4.6 always succeeds, as expected. I , ! 5 How to Assign CIDS to the Programs For the Vspace scheme to be usefd, the CIDS cannot be w si~ed to programs arbitrarily. Care must be taken so that the CIDS of programs with related content fit into low dimension hnear subspaces. In this section we present one systematic method of assigning CIDS to programs which achieves this god.
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--- Basketbw" co~ists of the tie tits 100001001.
The Topic Hierarchy
We assume that the programs can be naturdy organized in a hierarchy according to attributes such as their subject, language, rating, source, etc. We cd this hierarchy (or tree) the topic hierarchy.
We assign CIDS to programs in the hierarchy using the notion of prefi masks. Procedure MakeMask of Fi~e 3(i) recursively assigns the prefix masks by labeting the tepics from the root towards the leaves. The prefix mask of every topic is its own label concatenated to the mask of its parent, or eqtivdently, its own label concatenated to the labek of fl its ancestors. An example of a part of a topic hierarchy with the masks generated by the Makekf=ks procedure appears in Figure 3 (ii). Remarks:
q A label may be longer than the minimal number of bits required for Iabeting d the subtopics. For instance, consider a topic X at the lowest level of the tree, whose subtopics are individud programs. If the cumdative length of A"s mask is m bits then we maỹ~s ign~the remaining n -m bits for subtopic (i.e., The Iabek given to subtopics need not be consecutive. It may sometimes be beneficial to leave some labek unused.
The top level topic with label O, which is c~ed "Bonw" in Figure 3 (ii), has a special role. The reason for this wi~become clear in the next section, when we see how to generate a basis from the pr~x masks. Inform~y, users who buy some package We "fl the sports prg rams" wi~&o be entitled to some of the programs appeting in the Bonus hierarchy.
Computing a Basis from the Prefix Masks Shrgl&Topic Packages
We start by addressing the case of a package which contains d the programs in some topic X. Then the IabeEng done by procedure MakeMasks is such that the CIDS of d these programs share the same prefi mask, which is the mask reigned to topic X itse~. So our god here is to show how to generate a basis for a package of CIDS sharing a prefi p. The next Definition 5.3 fives an exp~cit construction of a basis BP for a bonus-extended package fiP. Then in Proposition 5.4 we prove that Span(B~) = OP. By this we show that~~is indeed a hear subspace, and that Definition 5.3 gives us a simple method of constructing a basis for it. Moreover, the proof dso shows that the entitlement for a package with a prefix p gives access precisely to the set UP and its bonuses, and to nothing eke. Remark: In this section we view the basis B~as a set of vectors rather than as a matriz. The comesponding n x (nm + 1) basis matrix h~~the vectors z, em~l, ..., en~its columns.
Proposition
Span(BP) =~P, thus~P is a linear subspace of dimension n -m + 1 and BP is a basis for it.
Proofi Clearly the hnear combinations of the standard vectors e~+l,.. ., en span every vector of the form 0~]1*, so BP spans d the bonus programs. Now the enabting vector z has l-bits ordy in the m most significant bits, which comprise the mask p. Any bit pattern in the lower n -m bits can be written as a tinear combination of the standard vectors emt 1, ..., en. Hence every CID p of the form PII* can be written as a combination of z and some standard vectors. We conclude that UP~Span(BP).
For the other direction, consider some Enear combination p of vectors in BP. Then the m-bit prefi of p is either p (if the combination includes the enabhng vector z) or Om (if z is not included). Thus UP~Span(B~).
The vectors in BP are clearly independent, so the dimen-. sionof UPisn-m+l.R emarks:
q The mask length of a topic is not determined by the position of the rightmost l-bit in the mask, but rather by the length of the labels assigned to the topic hierarchy. In the example of Figure 3 (ii), the "2.2 Bketbd" pacbge has a 7-bit mask 1000010, while the '2.2.0 CoUege Basketbd" package has a %bit mask 100001000, and both these masks lead to an identicd enab~ng vector. However the bases for the two packages differ in the standard vectors they cent aiq the "CoHege Basketbd" basis is (n -S)-dimensiond and does not contain eS and eg.
q Programs placed in the bonus hierarchy are shared by many packages. A package characterized by any pre fix mask of m bits *O contains the bonus CIDS of the form OWII*. The bonuses added to a pa~ge depend ofly on the length of the package's prefix mask. There fore we may speak of "m-bit bonuses", which contaiñ the bonus CIDS whose prefi is at least m @bits.
q If there is no need for bonus programs, it is always possible not to use CIDS from the bonus hierarchy at d. Then the ody cases in which two pa~ges share some programs (other than plaintext programs with CID p = O) is if one package contains the other.
5.2.2
Multi-Topic Packages So far we have seen how to create a basis for a package of the form "d the programs which belong to topic X". The case of a pa~ge which is the union of several topics is sifiar, with some imitations.
Suppose~ce wants to buy d the programs belonging to topics Xl ,..., Xt with masks pl,...,~t.
We start by generating the t corresponding bases BP1,..., BPi, as in Defition 5.3. Then we build a new basis B by repeatedy including the next vector from BP1 u . . . u BPt which is independent of d the vectors akeady in B. Cheting if a vector p is independent of the vectors currently in B can be done by solving a system of bear equations~M77]. It is not diffitit to see that the basis B generated in this manner does indeed span d the programs belonging to the requested topics.
However, there may be side-efiects to this procedure. This is since in general the union of hnear subspaces is not a hnear subspace. The computed basis B is the basis of a hnear subspace that contains fl the requested topics, and parts of the bonus hierarchy, but it may *O contain other (unrequested) parts of the topic hierarchy.
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Therefore there can be two different approaches to using the tepic hierarchy. The simpler but more restrictive approach is to offer ody packages which correspond to a single topic in the hierarchy, and avoid the complexities of possible sid~effects. The second approach is to let users choose several topics in the hierarchy, and to have the syt ern compute the subspace of programs that wodd actudy be accessible with fl the sideeffects. The users then need to be informed of what they wotid re~y be getting (and paying for).
The Security of the Schemes
When we consider the security of the ExtHeader and Vspace key management schemes, there are two modeh of attack that need to be addressed. In the more optimistic model, the secret information is stored in a ttiy tamper-proof chip inside the STT. Therefore a pirate can ody mount an attack using the transmission itse~. This model of attack is discussed in Section 6.1.
However experience shows that pirates are very succesf ti in breaking into such "tamper-proof" S~s.
In fact ody a handfti of the successfti attacks described in~cC96] can be classified as crypt-andyticd attacks, and ody against analog equivalents of simple substitution ciphers. N the rest exploit breaches in the "secure" chip. Therefore in Section 6.2 we discuss the consequences of the the pirates' ability to break into the secure tip.
Tamper-Proof Set-Top Terminals
If the STT contains ttiy secure memory, then our main concern is to protect against known-plaintext attacks. We argue that chosen-plaintext attacks are less hkely since they wotid require a pirate to cause the encryption and broadcast of specific content, and such activities may be notice able. On the other hand it is reasonable to assume that a pirate wotid have access to un-encrypted versions of prg rams, from sources such as video Ebraries or TV r~runs. Thus the encryption algorithm used to encrypt the programs must be resistaut to known-plaintext attacks. In addition the decryption algorithm must be efficient enough to sup port red-time video decoding.
The ExtHeader Scheme
Here the pirate can *O mount an attack against the covering algorithm, used to encrypt the program keys. The headers data attached to the programs contains: (a) Mtitiple encryptions of the same program key KP with~erent package keys, and (b) mtitiple encryptions of different prg ram keys with the same package key. Therefore a stream cipher whose basic operation is a XOR with a pseudo random string seems to be unsuitable as a covering algorithm. This is because the pirate wotid be able to obtain either XORS of program keys, or XORS of the pseudo random strings by XORing together various encryptions. Candidates for the covering algorithm may be DES~ES77] or Tripl~DES [ANS85].
Besides choosing a good covering~gorithm, another measure we can take is to pad the program keys with random strings, and then cover the padded key. This wotid increase the header size in proportion to the length of the padding. However problem (a) then becomes a smder concern since each header block of a program p wordd cover l(P padded with diflerent random string.
_.r, .
,---.-,
The Vspace Scheme
Here our concern is that the pirates may exploit the tinearity of the scheme. If the program encryption preserves the Lnearity of the key management, then a pirate maybe able to track the ifiuence of each bit of Key(p) on the encrypted pro~am. Then u~ing a known-plaintext attack, the pirate may be able to write Unear equations with the key bits as variables. If k such equations are co~ected then the syt ern of equations can be solved and Key(p) can be found. If r program keys are broken, for programs with hnearly independent CIDS, then the pirate can decrypt a subspace of programs of dimension 2r essentidy by using procedure Decrypt-V of Figure 2 . Thus every program can be de crypt ed if the keys of n hnearly independent programs are broken.
Therefore we must ensure that the encryption algorithm does not preserve tinearity. For this reason, algorithms based on hnear feedback shift registers (cf. [Go167]) may not be good choices. Mgonthms based on the discrete log problem (cf. [Od85]) may be inappropriate as we~, since in some sense the Mearity is preserved in the exponents, namelỹ agb =~a~b.
Engineering practices may be such that the system is de signed in a moddar way and the choice of video encryption dgonthm is made independently from the choice of the key management scheme. If this is the case, the key manage ment scheme shotid not output A'ey(p) = Mp as the key for program p, since the video encryption algorithm may preserve some hnearity. Rather, the encryption key shotid be h(Key(p)) where h(x) is a member of a universal family of hash function (cf.~ub96, ch. 8]). Practical choices may be MD5~v92] or SHA [SHA93] . By this the kearity is destroyed before the key is used in the fast video encryptioñ gorithm. This is &o important in order to prevent pirates who buy a package which is a subspace of dimension r from learning W the keys in the subspace by extracting ody r keys from the secure modde (i.e., in order to build a pirate decoder they wotid need to break into the secure memory).
When the "Tamper-ProoV Chip is Compromised
If the pirates are able to break into the secure memory of an STT, then clearly the security of the system is breached. We may assume that if the pirates break into Mce's STT then they learn d the secrets stored in that STT, and in partidar they can decrypt fl the programs that Mce is entitled to.~Our specific concern here is to ensure that the pirates wi~not be able to decrypt programs that Mce is not entitled to.
6.2.1
The ExtHeader Scheme
In the ExtHeader scheme, knowledge of some package keys in itse~does not help in breaking another package key, since these keys are chosen completely independently of each other. However if the pirates know a key si of some package i then they can mount a known-plaintext attack on the covering dgonthm. If some program p belongs to the exposed package i then the pirates can now uncover its key Z{P. This l(P becomes the plaintext that is covered by the key of every other package that p belongs to. So in addition 14 to the requirements mentioned in the Section 6.1.1, we &o need to ensure that the covering algorithm is resistant to known-plaintext attacks.
The Vspace Scheme
In the Vspace scheme the situation is margin~y more deticate when an STT is compromised. If Wce is entitled to a subspace of programs of dimension r, then her key matrix K is of dimension k x r. If the pirates learn this K, this knowledge is equivalent to knowing r of the mater keys (r columns of M). Knowing r master keys can help the pirate in obtaining keys to a program p that Mce is not entitled to, however the pirate's advantage is negligible. If Wce is not entitled top, then Key(p) is a finear combination of master keys, at least one of which is unknown to the pirate. However since the master keys are chosen so they are Enearly independent (recfl Section 4.2), the size of the enumeration space for Key(p) is stightly smde2 E -2" rather than 2k. The pirate is in the best situation if r = n -1 (ody one master key is missing): Then the enumeration space is of size 2k -2n-1, and if k >> n (say k = 2n) then the 2"-1 term is neghgible. Thus we see that the system security is essentidy intact despite the break-in.
If the pirates are able to break into other STTS that are entitled to Merent subspaces then they may co~ect more mmter keys. Then the subspace of programs they wotid be able to decrypt wodd be larger than the union of the broken STTS' entitlements. Note that in any key manage ment scheme, if the pirates manage to break into STTS of users who together are entitled to fl the programs then the pirates too can decrypt fl the programs. The difference is that in the Vspace scheme the pirates need ody to break into STTS of users whose entitlement bases together cent ain n hnearly independent vectors.
The Addressing Power of Vspace
The addressing power (dP) of a key management scheme is the number of different packages of programs that the vendor can offer. This number shodd be pararnetenzed by the number of secret bits stored in the STT (assuming the scheme does not add header information to the broadcast). If a scheme X needs b secret bits stored at the STT, then the best we codd hope for is the abihty to offer 2b different packages, i.e., dP(X) = 2b.
In the Vspace scheme, the STT stores kn bits thus we codd hope for an addressing power of dP(Vspace) = 2kn. Clearly not every possible setting of the secret bits is v~d since the user is ody dewed to buy tinear subspaces of prg rams. Nevertheless, we show that the number of packages a user can choose from is close to the maximal~due. The next proposition shows that dP(Vspace) = 2@(n ), which is optimal (up to constants in the exponent) when k and n are of the same order of magnitude. .---.
-.. We have seen that the simple ExtHeader scheme has excellent flexibihty, at the cost of extra header data that needs to be transmitted. In comparison, the Vspace scheme rq uir~~~sentidy no additiond headers and sti~enjoys high fle.xibitity, however carefd design decisions must be made to ensure the security of the system. Both schemes are practical, and offer better capabilities than schemes in current use. Some directions for future work are the fo~owing.
q In Section 6 we suggested some informal guidehnes to make the schemes secure against various attacks. An important addition wotid be to supply a formal proof of their security.
q The attractive features of the Vspace scheme rely on the hnearity of the scheme. However at the same time we need to be careti that this tinearity does not compromise the security of the scheme. Cau we design an efficient scheme which has high flexibfity and low additiond transmission overhead, yet does not rely on tinearity?
c An important aspect of smart-card based systems is their abl~ty to support~mp~e buying" of pay-perview events by storing some digitd cash on the smartcard, and deducting from it when the user decides to view a program. We wotid Eke to offer this feature without requiring a cflback to the head-end to obtain a new key. Is it possible to flow such imp~e buying wme maintaining the desirable property that keys to which the user is not entitled are not stored in the s~? Acknowledgments I am gratefti to Dan Heer for introducing me to the prob lems of broadcast encryption, and to Peter Witier for encouraging me to work on them. Daniel Bleichenbacher made numerous suggestions about the cryptographic properties of these systems. Shimon Even brought Gaussian coefficients to my attention. Remarks made by Avi Silberechatz led to the idea of caching headers in the ExtHeader scheme. I thank Amos Fiat and several anonymous referees whose comments helped me improve the presentation.
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